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ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the transformations in the area of State aid con-
trol prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic and provides a first assessment on the 
European Commission Temporary Framework on State aid measures to support the 
economy. It discusses whether the measures adopted have been effective and have 
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undertakings affected by COVID 19 long-term liquidity and to preserve fair competi-
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1. The COVID-19 Crisis
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a global tragedy of unprecedented 
scale, the gravest health crisis of our time. Yet, as with any other crisis, 
it cannot be considered an isolated and static event, but as a process born 
and developed on the basis of previous weaknesses and contradictions. Its 
effects will be long-lasting and will involve painful transformations that 
will not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. Antonio Gramsci, writing 
about the crisis of the liberal Italian State, famously wrote that “the crisis 
consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be 
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born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear”.1 
Presently, we are again in a moment of interregnum between the old and 
the new, whatever this may be. Morbid symptoms appear everywhere: bor-
ders are being raised again, and governments around the world are impos-
ing more and more trade controls. Some of them are frankly repugnant 
measures, such as restrictions on imports of medical protective equip-
ment. Bitter divisions and frictions have resurfaced, such as the North v. 
the South and the West v. the East.
As for the European Union, it is almost a given that the EU struggles 
with handling crises. If one looks at the 2008 financial crisis and the refu-
gee crisis, EU’s track record indicates difficulty in formulating a coordi-
nated response. However, after some hesitation, the EU has, albeit gradu-
ally, accepted the burden of dealing with such an unprecedented health 
crisis in a much more orderly fashion than some of its Member States and 
deserves credit for attempting to come up with practical solutions. It is 
exactly in this precise moment that the European Union has the responsi-
bility of governing in these difficult times. This being said, the aim of this 
article is to focus on the measures and policies adopted on the basis of pre-
existing tools and to analyse how they have been deployed. In particular, it 
will focus on the changes in State aid control, a field of EU supranational 
competence par excellence immediately “called into action” for the very 
obvious reason that the COVID-19 crisis has had instant economic reper-
cussions on virtually all economic sectors, thus requiring instant finan-
cial support from several, if not all EU Members States (plus the UK, of 
course). Crises are not just a time for emergency management, but a time 
to understand whether pre-existing rules, principles and regulations are 
enough or if new innovative solutions should be adopted. State aid control, 
in this context, must deal with the interregnum, whilst the regnum itself 
may need further inventive and bold solutions. 
2. The economic impact of COVID-19
It is important to pause for a moment to dissect more in depth what exactly 
are the specific economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, which 
sectors have been most affected and what evidence has been collected so 
1 Antonio Gramsci,  Selections from the prison notebooks  (New York: International Publishers, 
1971), 276. I am indebted to Milan Babic, “Let’s talk about the interregnum: Gramsci and the crisis 
of the liberal world order”, International Affairs 96, no. 3 (2020): 767, which has provided much 
food for thought. 
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far. In short, it is imperative that the need to support national economies 
is not simply taken for granted, but fully justified, and that the “legal” 
response to the pandemic is analysed in what respects its adequacy to the 
situation. As for the immediate, although it may be a bit too early to predict 
precise quantitative estimates, researchers are relying on a variety of high 
frequency indicators to measure the damage that several weeks of lock-
down have caused on general economic activities. For instance, electricity 
consumption during lockdown in Europe was around 5% lower than in 
early March of 2019, and the drop accelerated to 15% during mid-April 
2020.2 According to this study, a 1% drop in electricity usage is associated 
with 1.3% to 1.9% lower output in real economy, which is an enormous fig-
ure for a relatively short period. There are also some specificities that must 
be taken into account: firstly, the globalization of the pandemic; secondly, 
the lack of plausible comparators; and, thirdly, the different waves and 
their effects. Virtually, no geographical areas have been spared, making 
the management of international supply-chains exceedingly complex and 
causing a generalized drop in the international trade flow. According to a 
WTO estimate, trade is expected to fall between 13% and 32% as a result of 
COVID-19.3 As for possible comparators4, although some similarities can 
be drawn with the 2008 financial crisis, there are notable differences. The 
2008 financial crisis, despite its significance, had symmetrical effects on 
financial markets and spread much later to the real economy, whereas the 
impact of COVID-19 has been brutal in wiping off certain markets imme-
diately and without warning. Whilst, during the financial crisis, central 
banks and other monetary institutions were at least able to address the 
primary source of the shock – the cracks in the financial market and the 
demand crisis – those institutions can hardly implement the same meas-
ures with comparable effects in relation to the shock caused by COVID-19 
2 S. Chen et al, “Tracking the economic impact of COVID-19 and mitigation policies in Europe and 
the United States”, IMF Special Series on COVID-19, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/
WP/Issues/2020/07/10/Tracking-the-Economic-Impact-of-COVID-19-and-Mitigation-Policies-
in-Europe-and-the-United-49553.
3 WTO Director General, “Trade forecast press conference”, World Trade Organization, 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra303_e.htm.
4 Possible comparisons with the Spanish Flu are certainly useful, but the political, social and eco-
nomic context were in my view too different. See Robert Barro, José F. Ursua, and Joanna Weng, 
“The Coronavirus and the Great Influenza Epidemic – Lessons from the ‘Spanish Flu’ for the 
Coronavirus’s potential effects on mortality and economic activity”, CESifo Working Paper Series, 
no. 8166 (2020).
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on the real economy.5 Further variables within such asymmetry can also 
be detected as the economic effects of the pandemic varied according to 
the different “phases” of the response to COVID-19. The first phase of the 
pandemic impacted on demand response (essential goods up, services 
down), on specific sectors, such a hospitality and events, and on the size 
of companies.6 Yet, the second phase – cohabitation with the virus – will 
have long-term repercussions, namely lower production, aggregate supply 
slump, a significant decrease in aggregate demand, and possible general-
ised stagnation.7 Projections forecast a staggering contraction of economic 
activity in the EU of 5% to 10% and potentially even higher in case of a 
second wave of the pandemic.8 
3. State Aid and the COVID-19 crisis
Coronanomics effects9 should not be underestimated. However, COVID-
19 should not simply be relegated to the somehow comforting notion of 
black swan, as it is much more useful to consider it as “as a distinct phase of 
instability and uncertainty and not only as a transition between two stable 
periods”.10 Public spending measures adopted by Member States cannot, 
therefore, be seen as mere “medical urgency”. They must be placed within 
a wider economic cadre. After a rapid chronological exposé of the new 
measures adopted by the EU in the field of State aid law, an attempt will be 
made to discuss the specific new rules in such a wider context. 
3.1. A new but temporary Framework: a short chronology
On March 13th (possibly two weeks too late), the President of the European 
Commission, von der Leyen, declared “we will do whatever is necessary to 
5 See Jon Danielsson et al., “The coronavirus crisis is no 2008”, VoxEU CEPR, 2020, https://voxeu.
org/article/coronavirus-crisis-no-2008.
6 Louis-Philippe Béland, Abel Brodeur and Taylor Wright, “The short-term economic conse-
quences of COVID-19: Exposure to disease, remote work and government response”, IZA Institute 
of Labor Economics, Discussion Paper Series, no. 13159, 2020, http://ftp.iza.org/dp13159.pdf.
7 Suborna Barua, “Understanding Coronanomics: The economic implications of the coronavirus 
(COVID-19) pandemic”, MPRA Paper, no. 99693, 2020, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/99693/. 
See also the various contributions in Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Mitigating 
the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes (London: CEPR Press, 2020).
8 See, for instance, https://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/.
9 Martin S. Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebelo and Mathias Trabandt, “The macroeconomics of epidem-
ics”, NBER Working Papers, no. 26882, 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26882.pdf.
10 Babic, “Let’s talk about”, 769.
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support the Europeans and the European economy”.11 A long list of new 
initiatives was disclosed, the first of which being the announcement of new 
flexible rules on State aid. A few days later, on March 16th, Competition 
Commissioner Vestager sent Member States a draft proposal for a State 
Aid Temporary Framework to support the economy in the context of the 
COVID-19 outbreak, and declared “EU State aid rules provide a toolbox 
for Member States to take swift and effective action. We have two common 
goals: First, that businesses have the liquidity to keep operating, or to put 
a temporary freeze on their activities, if need be, and that support reaches 
the businesses that need it. Second, that support for businesses in one 
Member State does not undermine the unity that Europe needs, especially 
during a crisis. With this in mind, the Commission will enable Member 
States to use the full flexibility foreseen under State aid rules to tackle this 
unprecedented situation”.12 On March 19th, the Commission duly adopted 
what would be the first version of the Communication of a Temporary 
Framework.13 The TF acknowledged the need for Member States to act 
swiftly, while concurrently laying down the available options in terms of 
compatibility of State support measures with EU law. “Temporary” refers 
to the time limit of the TF, which will last until the end of 2020. The first 
version of the TF was mainly devoted to ensuring that sufficient liquidity 
remained available to businesses of all types and to preserving the conti-
nuity of economic activity during and after the COVID-19 outbreak. On 
April 4th, a first amendment was introduced to enable Member States to 
do everything possible to support the research, testing and production 
of coronavirus-relevant products.14 On May 13th, a second amendment 
was agreed.15 This one contained rather new substantive provisions, as it 
dealt with possible long-term repercussions by allowing Member States 
to proceed with recapitalisations and subordinated debt to companies in 
11 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_459.
12 “Statement by executive vice-president Vestager on a draft proposal for a State aid Temporary 
Framework to support the economy in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak”, Brussels, 17 March 
2020 at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/Statement_20_479.
13 Temporary Framework to support the economy in the context of the coronavirus outbreak (OJ C 
91I, 20.3.2020, pp. 1-9) TF. Thereafter “TF”. References in this script are based on the consolidated 
version of the Temporary Framework as amended on 3 April 2020, 8 May and 29 June 2020.
14 Communication from the Commission “Amendment to the Temporary Framework for State 
aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak”, 2020/C 112 I/01 
C/2020/2215 (OJ C 112I, 4.4.2020, pp. 1-9).
15 Second amendment to the Temporary Framework to support the economy in the context of the 
coronavirus outbreak (OJ C 164, 13.5.2020, pp. 3-15).
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need. Finally, on June 29th, the Commission adopted a third amendment 
excluding micro and start-up companies (undertakings with less than 50 
employees and less than €10 million of annual turnover and/or annual 
balance sheet total) from the TF’s scope of application.16 Together with a 
dedicated phone number, e-mail address, an ad hoc template notification 
form (all can be done in English!) and a series of Commission orientations 
in the field of transport and tourism,17 the final Temporary Framework 
has provided –for the time being – the framework (pun intended) for the 
approval of over 190 State aid measures.18 
The whole “enterprise” took around two months, these being the months 
in which Member States were worst hit. Considering that the nationaliza-
tion of Northern Rock occurred on February 22nd, 2008 and the European 
Commission adopted its first attempt to deal with the ensuing financial 
crisis in January 2009,19on this occasion the Commission acted considera-
bly quicker. To recap, the Temporary Framework is based on the following 
postulates: a) COVID-19, besides being a major public health emergency, 
also represents a major shock to both the global and the Union’s economies. 
b) Unlike any other past crises, the COVID-19 pandemic is having an 
impact on every single sector of the economy, from transport to SMEs, 
to retail, banking and so on. c) The money to support the economy at this 
stage will have to come mostly from the pockets of national governments. 
Thus, if a, b, and c stand as true, then State aid rules will have to be adapted 
to the unfolding reality, thus guaranteeing a quick and efficient procedure 
for State aid control. d) The need for a coordinated effort to make the meas-
ures adopted more effective and foster a quicker recovery still remains. 
The Framework therefore addresses an extensive range of possible State 
interventions: from sector-specific support, to more general measures to 
incentivise the flow of liquidity, access to credit, and recapitalization of 
affected undertakings. Finally, the Framework also emphasizes that this 
16 Communication from the Commission Third amendment to the Temporary Framework for 
State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, 2020/C 218/03 
C/2020/4509 OJ C 218, 2.7.2020, pp. 3-8.
17 For the complete list, see https://ec.europa.eu/competition/State_aid/what_is_new/covid_19.
html.
18 For the update list of Commission decisions, see https://ec.europa.eu/competition/State_aid/
what_is_new/State_aid_decisions_TF_and_107_2b_107_3b_107_3c.pdf.
19 Communication from the Commission – The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the 
current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortions of competition, OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, pp. 2-10.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   22 28/10/2020   23:06:49
23Governing the Interregnum: State Aid rules and the COVID-19 Crisis | Andrea Biondi
is not the time for a harmful subsidies race. In the Commission’s view, a 
coordinated and proportionate application of State aid rules could be vital 
in preserving at least some level of European solidarity.
3.2. The Temporary Framework and the EU system of State aid control 
EU’s system of State aid control is essentially based on an interdicire first 
and absolvere then process: Article 107(1) TFEU provides for a general 
prohibition imposed on Member States. It States: “any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain under-
takings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade 
between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market”. Article 
107(2) contains a series of grounds that automatically render the aid com-
patible with EU law, while paragraph (3) lists a series of additional grounds 
in which aid would be compatible. Consequently, it is possible for Member 
States to show that measures involving selective financial support are fully 
justified in pursuance of the general interest. In its Article 108, the Treaty 
transfers the decision on aid measures’ compatibility to a supranational 
referee, namely the European Commission. One especially important 
facet of State aid control is that it is of course mainly procedural. Under 
Article 108 TFEU, Member States are under the obligation to notify the 
Commission of any new planned aid and enter into negotiations to secure 
its approval. The initial step is akin to pre-trial discovery when facts, docu-
ments, and depositions need to be disclosed.20 This phase should enable the 
Commission to accurately assess whether the conditions laid down in the 
Treaty have been met and then to “absolve” the Member State in question. 
In the Commission’s decisional practice jargon, the Member State has to 
go through several hoops, which include showing that the aid is aimed at 
making a material improvement that the market alone is unable to deliver, 
there being a logical connection between the provision of aid and a change 
in the behaviour of the undertaking that receives the aid. Member States 
are also required to display that the measure will bring about the outcome 
the aid is intended to achieve, that the aid is limited to the minimum 
20 Even in those cases where notification is not required, Member States are still expected to be 
as transparent as possible. Member States are now required to publish all individual awards of 
aid that exceed EUR 0.5 million. See Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 (GBER) of 17 
June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of 
Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, pp. 1-78.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   23 28/10/2020   23:06:49
24  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 2 / october 2020 / 17-40
necessary to achieve the outcome and, lastly, that it is intended to pursue a 
“common European goal”. The COVID-19 pandemic is inevitably testing 
such a system, as it pressures the Commission to decide quickly and with 
as few objections as possible. It is, however, rather curious to read slightly 
empathic reactions labelling the TF as an entire suspension of State aid 
control. There are two basic elements to take into account to counteract 
such a claim. First, the TF is called “temporary” for a reason – its appli-
cation has the deadline (although it can be extended) of December 31st, 
2020. Secondly, the differentiated application of State aid rules when deal-
ing with emergencies is explicitly addressed within the founding Treaty 
itself in at least three provisions: 1) Article 107 (2)(b) requires de jure the 
European Commission to declare aid “to make good the damage caused by 
natural disasters or exceptional occurrences”. 2) Article 107 (3) allows the 
Commission to authorise aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the econ-
omy of a Member State. Finally, Article 108 (2) provides that, on applica-
tion by a Member State, the Council may decide that aid can be considered 
to be compatible with the internal market in derogation from the provisions 
of Article 107 if such a decision is justified by exceptional circumstances. 
These articles of the Treaty are there to help and support single Member 
States. Yet, to paraphrase AG Wahl’s Opinion delivered with reference to 
the banking crisis, recourse to the Treaty’s emergency-related legal basis 
“seems even more justified because several Member States were affected 
by a serious disturbance of their economy, which derived, to different 
degrees, from a global crisis”.21 It is not surprising that the Temporary 
Framework is based on Article 107(2)(b) and Article 107(3)(b), with its 
provisions relating to an exceptional event and aimed at governing such a 
phase, whilst the “ordinary” State aid rules continue to apply.22 The excep-
21 Judgment of 30 September 2016, Tadej Kotnik and Others v. Državni zbor Republike Slovenije, 
C-526/14ECLI: EU: C: 2016:102, para. 33. On the meaning of serious disturbance, see also 
T-132/96 and T143/96, Freistaat Sachsen and Others v. Commission EU:T:1999:326, paragraph 167; 
upheld on appeal (Judgment of 30 September 2003, Freistaat Sachsen (C-57/00 P) and Volkswagen AG 
and Volkswagen Sachsen GmbH (C-61/00 P) v. Commission of the European Communities, C-57/00 
P and C-61-00 P, EU:C:2003:510, paras 97 and 98. As for Commission practice see Commission 
Decision, Northern Rock, Case NN 70/07, OJ C 43, 16 February 2008, p. 1, Commission Decision, 
Rescue aid to Risikoabschirmung WestLB, Case NN 25/08, OJ C 189, 26 July 2008, p. 3. 
22 For instance, as specifically provided for by the TF (paragraph 14), it is still be possible for 
Member States to notify the Commission about “aid schemes to meet acute liquidity needs and 
support undertakings facing financial difficulties” under Article 107 (3)(c), that is, about “aid to 
facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such 
aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest”. The 
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tional character of the TF is evidenced by the frequent references to the 
fact that “the outbreak poses the risk of a serious downturn affecting the 
whole economy of the EU, hitting businesses, jobs and households”23 and 
by the extremely broad definition of the reasons why State interventions 
in the form of recapitalization are in the EU’s common interest.24 As dis-
cussed above, these assumptions are unfortunately proving to be correct. 
Still, this may arguably be a slightly naïve reconstruction, as the TF is yet 
another instrument of Commission soft law which did not go through the 
institutional and democratic guarantees of a legislative process. Thus, its 
content and provisions are exposed to the “traditional” concerns in terms 
of legitimacy, transparency and accountability other soft law instruments 
face. Furthermore, it has been noted that, especially regarding State aid 
law, soft law is generally issued following robust consultations. However, 
the scarce information contained within the Commission’s press releases 
makes it difficult to appreciate how much, in this instance, Member States 
were involved.25 Although these criticisms are well founded, it is also true 
that once again the adoption of the TF is predicated on the need to react to 
a real emergency, and, whilst some of the provisions contained in the TF 
can and must be criticized, the flexible adaptability that soft law instru-
ments can guarantee seems to me to be essential. However, two principles 
questions must be tackled. Firstly, the pressure to authorise State measures 
as quickly as possible may actually prevent the Commission from having 
enough time for a proper scrutiny and, secondly, by regulating softly today 
for emergency times, the effects of the new rules may “harden” later and 
produce lasting effects well beyond the context of a crisis. 
Commission has so far authorised various schemes in nine different Member States under such a 
legal base. 
23 TF, paragraph 9. 
24 TF, paragraph 49(b). This is a point rightly noted by Massimo Merola, “Aiuti di stato e Covid 
19 – webinar session”, Associazione Italiana Antitrust, June 2020, https://www.associazionean-
titrustitaliana.it/attivita/webinar/aiuti-di-stato-ai-tempi-del-coronavirus-parte-2-il-temporary-
framework-della-commissione-europea-e-le-ricapitalizzazioni-in-equity/.
25 Oana Stefan, “COVID-19 soft law: Voluminous, effective, legitimate? A research agenda”, 
European Papers 5, no. 1 (2020).
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4. Governing the pandemic: the four pillars of the TF 
The TF is trying to govern the pandemic response process in four ways. 
First, it is founded on the multi-level economic model on which the EU is 
based upon, and reaffirms the national and supranational co-participation 
with regard to the allocation of spending powers. Secondly, it aims to regu-
late the economic repercussions in terms of short term liquidity. Thirdly, 
it considers the terms of long-term viability of the European economy. 
Lastly, it attempts to steer State spending decisions towards the attainment 
of virtuous policies.
4.1 Not everything is a State aid
The EU has no specific competence to regulate healthcare. Article 168 
TFEU specifically details that the responsibility for organizing and deliver-
ing health services and medical care is under the authority of each Member 
State. EU health policy therefore serves to complement national policies. 
Within the context of State aid, although with some uncertainties, it is 
now widely accepted that it is MS’s duty to provide solidarity concerning 
healthcare towards its citizens in need26 and the predominantly non-eco-
nomic character of healthcare services.27 The public health rationale resur-
faces in the Commission’s decisions to approve COVID-19 State support 
measures. In several of them, the Commission has specifically declared 
that any financial support from national funds granted to health services 
or other public services to tackle the coronavirus situation falls outside 
the scope of State aid control, thus strongly reaffirming the non-economic 
character of health services. State aid does not apply to any State activity, 
nor does it prohibit MS from adopting economic measures (and it does 
not even require governments to “spend”). Horizontal expenditures (those 
applicable across the economic sectors) are not caught by State aid con-
trol, as they are deemed not to be anti-competitive per se. The TF acts as a 
“reminder” that national measures taken in response to COVID-19 are not 
caught by State aid rules.28 The Irish government, for instance, introduced 
26 Judgment of 11 July 2006, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v. 
Commission of the European Communities, C-205/03 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:453, paragraphs 25 to 28 
and Judgment of 11 June 2020, European Commission and Slovak Republic v. Dôvera zdravotná 
poist’ovňa, a.s., C262/18 P and C271/18 P, ECLI: EU:C:2020:450.
27 See Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU 
C/2016/2946 OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, pp. 1-50, paragraph 2.4 and SA.39913 concerning compensation 
of public hospitals in the region of Lazio in Italy, 4.12.2017 C (2017) 7973 final.
28 The De Minimis Regulation no. 1407/2013 is of course also applicable in this context.
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new measures to provide financial support to workers affected by the 
COVID-19 crisis. The scheme is activated directly by employers through 
the payroll system (Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme)29 and is aimed at 
keeping employees “on the books” until business picks up again after the 
crisis. It is available to all employers whose business activities are being 
adversely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Modifications to the ini-
tial scheme have widened its scope as to include, for instance, apprentices 
and training programmes. These policy choices — even the most socially 
innovative — are completely “indifferent” from the perspective of EU State 
aid law, and Member States are entirely free to pursue them. Any measures 
restricted to certain sectors, regions or types of undertakings involve an 
element of aid, as they are inherently selective.30 
4.2 Damages must be compensated
Not surprisingly, the very first measures notified under the TF concerned 
a scheme devised by Denmark to compensate organizers for damages 
suffered due to the cancellation of events with more than 1,000 partici-
pants. The Commission, in less than 24 hours, authorized them.31 The first 
options made available to Member States by the TF rely on Article 107 
(2)(b), which provides that aid to rectify the damage caused by natural 
disasters or exceptional occurrences is de jure compatible with EU law. 
The COVID-19 outbreak, according to the Commission, qualifies as an 
exceptional occurrence, as it is an extraordinary, unforeseeable event hav-
ing a significant economic impact and is not caused by a natural disaster. 
This is, in all likelihood, substantially correct, but it also has legal implica-
tions, as measures adopted to compensate for damage caused by natural 
disasters are now largely exempted from notification under Article 50 of 
the GBER.32 The Commission’s role under Article 107(2)(b) is essentially 
to verify that certain conditions are satisfied, namely that the damage for 
which the compensation is granted is a direct consequence of the natural 
29 See, for further details: https://www.revenue.ie/en/corporate/communications/covid19/tempo-
rary-covid-19-wage-subsidy-scheme.aspx.
30 TF, paragraph 3.9.
31 SA.56685. As for the 27th of June, 19 measure were notified and approved by the Commission – in 
my view, a rather surprisingly small number – and one may wonder whether the extreme flexibility 
granted under the other options did not simply ‘channel’ Member States’ notifications under those 
broader categories, albeit under this other option, the Commission’s discretion to evaluate the 
soundness of member State is a mentioned is much more intense.
32 Cit. above.
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disaster. The aid cannot result in overcompensation for damage as well, 
and it is meant to solely rectify the damage caused by the natural disas-
ter. These conditions still need to be proven by Member States, and not 
simply presumed. In the past, the Commission sanctioned any attempts 
by national governments to artificially widen the scope of compensation 
measures by applying them to damages not directly suffered as a result 
of the event in question.33 Thus, it is for MS to provide a clear causal link 
between the aid and the subsequent occurring damage. Within the TF, the 
Commission found the causality chain satisfied in the case of €5.4 billion 
granted by Denmark, as this was restricted to companies that had suffered 
a decline in their revenues of more than 40 % as a result of the coronavirus 
outbreak from March 9th to June 9th 2020.34 It may however not always 
be so straightforward to determine how and when certain damages have 
occurred. In this respect, the TF further specifies how COVID-19 related 
measures should be applied in relation to the Rescue and Restructuring 
Guidelines.35 According to the Commission, the principle of “one time last 
time” which sets that rescue and restructuring aid can be granted only 
once over a period of 10 years does not apply to aid declared compatible 
under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU. This means that Member States can still 
compensate undertakings that have already received aid under the R&R 
Guidelines for the damages directly caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. 
The dividing line between the pre and post COVID-19 economic situa-
tion of an undertaking may be trickier to determine than expected. For 
instance, the green light given to a €550 million loan granted by Germany 
to regional charter airline Condor has been singled out as particularly 
problematic.36 The damages sustained were caused by the cancellation or 
re-scheduling of airline flights as a result of the imposition of travel restric-
tions, but the peculiar aspect is that the Commission authorized, just last 
October, a €380 million rescue loan to Condor when it was affected but 
the collapse of the Thomas Cook Group, to which it belonged. As Stated 
by Condor, the second loan will be used to repay the previous one, so one 
can only speculate whether this measure is targeting specific damages suf-
fered by the airline because of COVID-19 or if it is just a second tranche 
33 Aid to Italian Regions hit by natural disasters OJ L 43, 18/2/2016.
34 SA.56774.
35 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring 
non-financial undertakings in difficulty OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, pp. 1-28.
36 SA.56867.
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of the original loan.37 The quantification of the damages has been post-
poned until after the end of the COVID-19 crisis and will be based on the 
airline’s operating accounts for the year 2020, with a lower likelihood of 
rigorous checks on whether the measure did actually overcompensate the 
beneficiary. 
4.3. Short Term Liquidity
Most of the Temporary Framework, however, is devoted to the possible 
use of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, which makes aid “to remedy a serious dis-
turbance in the economy of a Member State” compatible with EU law. The 
Communication makes it clear that a strict interpretation of any excep-
tional provision such as Article 107(3)(b) TFEU is necessary, and that only 
those measures which are appropriate and proportionate to remedy a seri-
ous disturbance in the economy of the Member State concerned will be 
deemed compatible. All measures are available to beneficiaries that were 
not in difficulty before the outbreak (December 31st 2019), although this 
time the reference benchmark is the one contained in Article 2(18) the 
GBER, not in the R&R Guidelines.38 The Framework lists five types of aid 
deemed compatible:
Direct grants, selective tax advantages and advance payments – Member 
States will be able to set up schemes to grant up to €800,000 to a company 
to address its urgent liquidity needs.
State guarantees for loans taken by companies from banks – Member 
States will be able to provide State guarantees to ensure credit access.
Loans to companies – Member States will be able to grant loans with 
favourable interest rates to companies.
Short-term export credit insurance (known as STEC) for risks which 
are normally shouldered by private insurance companies, but which are 
temporarily unavailable in the market due the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
is a derogation from the rules applicable to STEC.
Measures to ensure that banks can continue to guarantee liquidity to 
the real economy. The Framework “transforms” such aid into aid directly 
37 Media reports suggest that the new loan was also needed, as the contractually agreed new owner 
PGL (Polish Aviation Group) withdrew because of Covid-19. 
38 The two definitions are of course similar, whilst not identical, and the scope of application is also 
different. The R&R Guidelines are horizontally applicable to all sectors, whilst the GBER rules are 
delimited by the scope of the Regulation itself. There is no real explanation in the TF as to why a 
different reference point has been employed.
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granted to banks’ customers, not to the banks themselves, and provides 
some guidelines on how to ensure minimal distortion of competition 
between banks.
Apart from these ex ante general categories, it is possible for Member 
States to notify the Commission of “aid schemes to meet acute liquidity 
needs and support undertakings facing financial difficulties, also due to or 
aggravated by the COVID-19 outbreak”. 
All the types of measures are aimed at providing support in dealing with 
short-term repercussions. 
4.4. Long-term Liquidity
As highlighted above, COVID-19 economic repercussions are likely to be 
long-term. Thus, in its second amendment, the TF allows Member States 
to notify the Commission of measures involving the recapitalization of 
undertakings in essentially all forms: pure equity forms (capital injections, 
new shares) and hybrid capital instruments (unsecured bonds, profit par-
ticipation rights). Recapitalization, however, can only be granted to benefi-
ciaries that were not in difficulty before the outbreak (December 31st 2020). 
Again, the benchmark for reference is the one contained in Article 2(18) of 
the GBER. Eligible companies must also be unable to find financing from 
the market on affordable terms. The TF – in line with the Commission’s 
practice – lays down some basic principles, such as that recapitalization 
should be in the common interest, aid must not go beyond the minimum 
level as to restore the beneficiary’s viability, and so on. If there is an aid 
exceeding €250 million, the Commission must be separately notified of 
this. The detailed rules provide mechanisms to ensure that the State shall 
receive appropriate remuneration for the investment – the closer the remu-
neration to market terms, the lower the potential competition distortion 
caused by State intervention. The TF also provides that the State will be 
incentivized to allow the beneficiary to return to normal market condi-
tions. Each form of recapitalization is also subject to specific economic 
parameters designed to ensure that the intervention conforms to market 
criteria.39
39 For equity, injections by the State must be based on a price that does not exceed the average share 
price of the beneficiary over the 15 days preceding the request for the capital injection. If the com-
pany is not listed, an estimate of its market value should be established by an independent expert or 
by other proportionate means. Furthermore, any recapitalisation measure shall include a step-up 
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   30 28/10/2020   23:06:49
31Governing the Interregnum: State Aid rules and the COVID-19 Crisis | Andrea Biondi
5. Haste v. Speed
Up until now, the Commission has received and approved 270 measures, 
most of them approved within 48 hours. According to the State Aid Hub 
website, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy and Poland have imple-
mented 15 or more COVID-19 related measures, whilst the average number 
of measures per Member State is 9.6.40 Impressive numbers! As mentioned, 
there is the risk that the necessity of a speedy process may result in excess 
haste. On March 20th, for instance, Germany notified the Commission of 
two measures for loans with subsidised interest rates for any type of under-
takings requiring liquidity. The aid was to be granted either directly by 
KfW — the German State-owned development bank — or by other credit 
institutions. On March 22nd, the Commission approved the scheme.41 
Cynics may say that two days is not enough time to assess the full com-
plexity of the German scheme. This is a fair point of concern. However, 
Germany carefully constructed the measures in the form of subsidised 
interest rates for loans, in line with the specific rules on applicable inter-
est rates/duration/amounts laid down in the Framework. Furthermore, 
the Commission paid specific attention to rules intended to ensure that 
banks were only “conduits” to underlings, for instance, by defining maxi-
mum interest rates for the loan contracts between the credit institutions 
and the final beneficiaries. Even when confronted with so-called “umbrella 
schemes” – that is to say, very broad State schemes encompassing a variety 
of support measures – analysis and assessment by the Commission are 
still present42, and nearly all the Commission’s decisions are published on 
its website (with some notable exceptions), all being judicially reviewable. 
This is not to say that all decisions are going to prove correct, and there 
are already some puzzling decisions where few details have been released. 
Yet, despite the emergency, the basic tenets of the system of State aid con-
trol have been kept in place. Another major concern is ensuring that a 
framework devised to tackle an emergency does not develop into the new 
normal. Once again, contrary to the situation the Commission found itself 
in during the financial crisis, where it had to learn by error,43 in my view, 
mechanism increasing the remuneration of the State to incentivise the beneficiary to buy back the 
State capital injections. TF, paragraphs 60 and 61.
40 Update on TF at https://www.lexxion.eu/en/State-aid-blog/.
41 SA.56714.
42 See, for instance, SA 56841 (UK Umbrella Scheme).
43 See inter alia Joana Gray, Francesco de Cecco, “Competition, stability and moral hazard: The 
tension between financial regulation and State aid control”, in Research Handbook on State Aid in 
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the TF is very alert to the present problem at hand. Let us take two exam-
ples. As far as the State can guarantee, the TF logically attributes a crucial 
role to banks in the implementation of COVID-19 related measures, par-
ticularly by facilitating credit to SMEs — some of the worst affected types 
of businesses. It specifies, however, that aid granted by Member States, 
both under Article 107(2)(b) and (3)(b) TFEU, does not have the objec-
tive of preserving or restoring banks’ viability, liquidity or solvency. It is 
difficult not to imagine that such a vast deployment of State guarantees 
will still benefit banks. However, the TF seems to imply that such indirect 
aid may have to be accepted. Consequently, such aid would not qualify 
as extraordinary public financial support under Directive 2014/59/EU 
(so called the BRRD),44 and would therefore not be assessed under strict 
State aid rules, such as bail-in rules, for example, applicable to the bank-
ing sector.45 Arguably, this seems correct as, for instance, even in the Notice on the notion 
of aid the Commission acknowledges that “a mere secondary economic effect (...) 
can be found where the aid is simply channelled through an undertaking 
(for example a financial intermediary) which passes it on in full to the aid 
beneficiary.”46 Still, the quid pro quo is that the Framework requires that “credit 
institutions or other financial institutions should, to the largest extent pos-
sible, pass on the advantages of the public guarantee or subsidised inter-
est rates on loans to the final beneficiaries”. Banks will therefore be under 
the obligation to show that they can effectively implement mechanisms to 
ensure that aid is passed on and, by failing that, strict aid to banks rules 
will be applicable. For instance, Spain guarantees operating loans accord-
ing to maturity and size. The measures adopted also limit the risk by the 
State to a maximum of 80% for self-employed workers and SMEs, and of 
70% for larger enterprises. This ensures that support is swiftly available 
the Banking Sector, ed. François-Charles Laprévote, Joanna Gray and Francesco de Cecco (United 
Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 20. 
44 OJ L 173, 12.06.2014 p. 190-348.
45 Conversely, in case of the banks experiencing liquidity shortage, BRRD rules will continue to 
apply. The TF is based on a fingers-crossed assumption that the economic crisis will not lead to 
such a disastrous consequence of eventually affecting banks’ liquidity. Still in that scenario, the 
TF now provides that extraordinary public support measures required by COVID-19 related prob-
lems are not going to be subject to the strict requirement of burden sharing by shareholders and 
subordinated creditors. TF, paragraph 7. For an in-depth discussion, see Phedon Nicolaides, “The 
Corona Virus can infect banks too: The applicability of the EU banking and State aid regimes”, 
European State Aid Law Quarterly 19, 1 (2020).
46 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, pp. 1-50, Footnote 181.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   32 28/10/2020   23:06:49
33Governing the Interregnum: State Aid rules and the COVID-19 Crisis | Andrea Biondi
with favourable conditions and limited to those who require it in these 
unprecedented circumstances. Although the new measure still provides 
that the actual granting of loans and financing will be determined by the 
internal proceedings of the bank, the new scheme contains some safe-
guards to ensure that the aid is effectively channelled to the beneficiar-
ies in need. An example of one of these safeguards is that new loans and 
renewals will be maintained within the costs applied before COVID-19 
and commitments undertaken by banks, such as revolving credit facilities 
to their clients before the outbreak, will be fulfilled.47 Turning now to recapitali-
zations and other more “permanent” measures, it has quickly become evident that the “afford-
ability” of those measures may vary considerably from one Member State to another, not all of 
them being capable of providing the same degree of support to their undertakings. Some com-
mentators and EU institutions immediately identified the risk of creating market distortions. 
As noted by Motta and Petz, when public money is used to go beyond the provision of liquid-
ity, “a firm that is generously funded by its home country becomes artifi-
cially more competitive, to the detriment of other equally or more efficient 
rival companies” in less rich Member States.48 These concerns have been 
largely addressed in the second amendment of the TF. There are indeed 
a series of stringent criteria imposed both on beneficiaries and governments. As for benefi-
ciaries of COVID-19 aid, they will be prohibited from advertising for commercial 
purposes. Most importantly, if at least 75% of the COVID-19 recapitali-
zation measures are not redeemed, beneficiaries will be prevented from 
acquiring a more than 10% stake in competitors or other operators in the 
same line of business, including upstream and downstream operations. 
Before the full redemption of COVID-19 recapitalization measures, ben-
eficiaries cannot make dividend payments or non-mandatory coupon pay-
ments, nor buy back shares other than in relation to the State. There are 
also several constraints on management, such as on remuneration, and a 
47 Resolución de 25 de marzo de 2020, approved by the EC with SA.56803.
48 Massimo Motta and Martin Petz, “EU State aid policies in the time of COVID-19”, VoxEU CEPR, 
2020, https://voxeu.org/article/eu-State-aid-policies-time-covid-19; see also Alfonso Lamadrid and 
José Luis Buendia, “A moment of truth for the EU: A proposal for a State aid solidarity  fund”, 
Chilling Competition, 2020, https://chillingcompetition.com/2020/03/31/a-moment-of-truth-for-
the-eu-a-proposal-for-a-State-aid-solidarity-fund/. As for the EU, see “Von der Leyen warns State 
aid ‘unlevelling the playing field’ in Europe”, The Guardian, 13 May 2020, https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2020/may/13/ec-president-warns-State-aid-is-unlevelling-the-playing-field-in-
europe, and “EU’s Vestager: Discrepancy in State aid distorts single market, hampers recovery” 
Reuters, 18 May 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-Stateaid/eus-
vestager-discrepancy-in-State-aid-distorts-single-market-hampers-recovery-idUSKBN22T0OU.
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total ban on bonuses. There must be a clear exit strategy, which the ben-
eficiary must submit to their government, which will in turn submit it to 
the Commission. Finally, for the measures above €250 million, “Member 
States must propose additional measures to preserve effective competition 
in those markets. In proposing such measures, Member States may in par-
ticular offer structural or behavioural commitments”.49
The cumulative effect of all these conditions is particularly burdensome, 
to the point of possibly having a discouraging effect, as companies may 
prefer to rely on other types of support aid because having the State as a 
shareholder may make life more difficult. After all, the TF itself clearly sug-
gests that recapitalization measures should be considered an instrument of 
last resort. The new rules brought in by the TF have been tested in the form 
of recapitalization measures for the aviation sector, a perennial problem-
atic segment of the market now particularly hit by the pandemic. Once 
again, the Commission was quick to act, displaying both adaptability and 
resilience. The first measure notified and approved by the Commission 
on June 10th dealt with a €285 million recapitalization of Finnair, whose 
majority shareholder is the Finnish State. The Commission was swayed 
by the fact that capital was expected to rise to €500 million. The differ-
ence was assured by several market investors, whilst State participation 
remained the same in terms of shares. Curiously, the Commission Stated 
that certain governance commitments intended to provide incentives for 
redemption of the State aid as soon as possible were not appropriate or 
necessary in these circumstances.50 In other words, if the State is already 
present, there is no need to provide for an exit strategy, despite the fact that 
the company does eventually strengthen its position in the market. How 
and whether the TF was going to operate with respect to public or partially 
public undertakings was clearly a lacuna uncovered by the Finnair deci-
sion, a lacuna promptly filled by ad hoc change of the TF that now speci-
fies the rules applicable, thus distinguishing the situations in which the 
State is, and is not, a stakeholder. The second notification also dealt with 
airlines: on June 25th, the Commission authorised a €6 billion recapitaliza-
tion of Lufthansa. Germany submitted a business plan containing plans of 
redemption by 2026. In line with the TF rules, Lufthansa is subject to bans 
49 TF, paragraph 72. These will need to be laid down in line with the Commission Notice on 
remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 and under Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004.
50 SA.56809. The decision has been challenged by Ryanair.
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on dividends and share buyback and limits on remuneration of their man-
agement, including a ban on bonus payments. Finally, until at least 75% of 
the recapitalization is redeemed, Lufthansa will be prevented from acquir-
ing a stake of more than 10% in competitors or other operators in the same 
line of business. Lufthansa is also the first example of a recapitalization 
measure above €250 million applied to a company that definitively holds 
significant market power in its relevant market. The Commission decided 
to impose structural remedies consisting mainly in the divestment of up 
to 24 slots/day at Frankfurt and Munich hub airports and some related 
additional assets. Germany was also required to re-notify a restructuring 
plan for Lufthansa if the exit of the State were to be in doubt six years after 
receiving the recapitalization aid, thus making “ordinary” State aid rules 
applicable again. Reactions have been mixed, with competitors launching 
legal proceedings against the Commission. One decision may not be suf-
ficient to identify what the pervading attitude of the Commission will be. 
A closer analogy would be with the Commission’s practice regarding R & 
R. The guidelines make the granting of aid conditional upon several fac-
tors, including the imposition of compensatory measures such as reduc-
tion of capacity, withdrawal from certain market segments and sale of 
assets. Large undertakings are those mainly affected by R & R aid, and 
the Commission’s preferred type of compensatory measure is reduction of 
capacity. It may be argued that, as the premise of granting such aid is the 
pandemic, the Commission might be inclined to adapt a less strict atti-
tude. Furthermore, the magnitude and extent of the COVID-19 impact 
may make the level and intensity of the conditions vary significantly from 
sector to sector, depending on a variety of factors. It may also widen the 
opportunity for a further use of behavioral conditions because of their 
flexibility, their attitude to shape the future51 of economic entities, and 
their non-discriminatory open-access nature.52 
51 EU Remedies Notice, para. 17.
52 See Ariel Ezrachi, “Behavioural remedies in EC merger control, scope and limitations”, World 
Competition 29, no. 3 (2006): 459. Behavioral remedies have been used for instance in guaranteeing 
access to key technology, infrastructure and supply obligations – all sectors possibly relevant in a 
COVID-19 scenario. See, in the merger context, European Commission Decision of 18 January 
2018, Qualcomm/NXP Semiconductos, Case M.8306.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   35 28/10/2020   23:06:49
36  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 2 / october 2020 / 17-40
6. The TF and EU public policies
As discussed so far, the main aim of the TF is to guarantee a system which 
is as fair and efficient as possible to govern the emergency phase of the 
COVID-19 crisis, although it does also cast light upon the ambition to 
look at the future of the European economy. Through its rules, the TF is 
attempting to ensure that State measures are devised in a way that meets 
EU’s general policy objectives relating to consumer protection and both 
the green and digital transformation of EU economy. It is not sufficiently 
clear how such an ambition will translate into practice. On the plus side, 
especially after the transformations State aid control has been through in 
the last ten years, “horizontal” does not need to be equated with econ-
omy wide. National policies can be tailored to specific sectors if these are 
proven to foster good business practice and competitiveness.53 The General 
Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) is, after all, just a recognition that if 
public spending is targeted at growth-promoting policies that fulfil com-
mon European objectives,54 these are considered “good” economic policies 
for contributing to the aims listed above and do not need to be notified to 
the Commission. Under the category of “good aid”, many provisions of the 
TF are devoted to public spending in the area of Research & Development 
(R&D), for instance. Although the legal basis is Article 107(3)(c) and, thus, 
measures need to be notified, the TF de facto exempts and thus favours any 
grant linked to R&D projects carrying out COVID-19 and other antiviral-
relevant research related “to vaccines, medicinal products and treatments, 
medical devices and hospital and medical equipment, disinfectants, and 
protective clothing and equipment, and […] relevant process innovations 
for an efficient production of the required products”.55 The thresholds are 
particularly generous as, for instance, eligible aid is up to 100% for fun-
damental research, 80% for industrial research and industrial develop-
ment, plus a bonus system if more than one Member State supports the 
projects or if there is cross-border collaboration. As in times of non-crisis, 
the rationale for governments to support R & D is, in reality, to simply 
stop acknowledging spillovers (that is to say, even the smartest of produc-
ers cannot completely prevent others from using the new knowledge), and 
so tax incentives or direct grants can at least “alleviate” a possible loss. In 
53 Michael Blauberger, “Of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subsidies: European State aid control through soft and 
hard law”, West European Politics 32, no. 4 (2009): 719.
54 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014, cit. above.
55 Ibid., paragraph 3.6.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   36 28/10/2020   23:06:49
37Governing the Interregnum: State Aid rules and the COVID-19 Crisis | Andrea Biondi
times of crisis, other rationales become more prominent, such as the true 
need to stimulate business to invest more in public policies, such as health 
care.56 The TF goes even further, as it requires that the industry benefitting 
from the aid commits to granting third parties within the EU non-exclu-
sive licenses under non-discriminatory market conditions. Furthermore, 
during the COVID-19 crisis, the Commission has been extremely clear 
in telling Member States that voucher-based compensations instead of 
refunds for travel and tourism are not effectively protecting passenger 
rights. Thus, in a separate Communication, it invites Member States to 
support operators, yet relying on the TF.57 Finally, by excluding micro-
companies and start-ups – in the third amendment – from the applica-
tion of the TF, and even those which were already in difficulty before the 
COVID-19, the Commission has given its blessing to public spending 
measures intended to foster innovative start-up companies identified as 
“crucial” for the economic recovery of the Union.58 On the minus side, 
the TF also makes a specific reference to the need to “tailor” State sup-
port to more general EU polices such as digitalization and the EU Green 
deal agenda and environment protection. Certain MS’s spending decisions 
received considerably good press, the most notable thereof being France’s 
decision to make aid available to Air France conditional to reductions in 
internal flights. Some scepticism here is advisable. In the case of Air France, 
at the time of writing, the full decision has not been published yet, and we 
have only press Statements by the government.59 EU State aid, of course, 
encourages Member States to spend green, but it is always a requirement 
that the aid must effectively encourage the beneficiary to invest in a more 
environmentally friendly option.60 A reduction in CO2 emissions in terms 
of internal flights is hardly impressive, as it is a solution that does not truly 
56 See Ben R. Martin, “R&D policy instruments – a critical review of what we do and don’t know”, 
Industry and Innovation, 23, no. 2 (2016): 157.
57 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/648 of 13 May 2020 on vouchers offered to passen-
gers and travellers as an alternative to reimbursement for cancelled package travel and transport 
services in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, C/2020/3125 OJ L 151, 14.5.2020, pp. 10-16.
58 TF, Third amendment, cit. above, para.7.
59 See https://www.france24.com/en/20200524-air-france-must-slash-domestic-traffic-in-
exchange-for-State-aid-minister-says.
60 Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 (2014/C 200/01) and 
GBER, cit. above.
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innovate.61 Although much discussed, these clauses62 pertain more to the 
next phase, namely the recovery of the EU economy, and asking the TF 
to provide an answer is both ungenerous and also probably not “legally” 
justifiable, as the decision on how the regnum will be transformed and 
changed by this contemporary pest belongs to the full constitutional and 
regulatory framework under which the EU operates. The current debate 
about the Commission proposal on the so-called Next Generation EU is 
an encouraging sign for the future.
7. Conclusion: the pessimism of the intellect and the optimism of the will
Some time ago, Elisabetta Righini and I wrote an article where we argued 
that the story of State aid control is one of resilience and adaptation, as 
State aid law has been constantly evolving and adapting to the transforma-
tion of the EU, its market and its rules.63 The TF is another chapter in such 
story. To go back to Gramsci and one of his other most famous dicta, State 
aid control is also (and perhaps mostly) about the pessimism of the intel-
lect, as it forces us to look at the world as it is, trying to probe its dynamics 
and come up with possible workable solutions. The TF has largely man-
aged to govern the interregnum and fight the most morbid of symptoms. 
A segment buried in the third amendment of the TF is Article 16, which 
provides that aid “shall not be conditioned on the relocation of a produc-
tion activity or of another activity of the beneficiary from another coun-
try within the EEA to the territory of the Member State granting the aid. 
Such condition would appear to be harmful to the internal market”. Such 
a strong and perhaps unprecedented stance against localism and purely 
national interests in this time of crisis may also manifest the optimism of 
the will, believing that the world can be a better place and that it can face 
new challenges and overcome crises of rarely experienced magnitude.
61 See for instance the Commission investigation on aid granted by Spain to Air Nostrum as to 
enable the company to renew its fleet. The Commission has doubts on whether that support has a 
real incentive effect, SA.50707.
62 Another example are the measures adopted by Denmark and Poland. See R. Federico, “Aiuti di 
stato e concorrenza fiscale tra Stati: la crisi della sovranità nazionale durante l’emergenza Covid-
19”, Concorrenza e Mercato 2020, I (2020).
63 A. Biondi and Elisabetta Righini, “An evolutionary theory of State aid control”, in The Oxford 
Handbook of European Law, eds. Damian Chalmers and Anthony Arnull (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015).
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   38 28/10/2020   23:06:49
39Governing the Interregnum: State Aid rules and the COVID-19 Crisis | Andrea Biondi
Bibliography
Babic, Milan. “Let’s talk about the interregnum: Gramsci and the crisis of the liberal 
world order”. International Affairs 96, no. 3 (2020): 767-786.
Baldwin, Richard and Beatrice Weder di Mauro. Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: 
Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes. London: CEPR Press, 2020.
Barro Roberto, José F Ursua, and Joanna Weng. “The Coronavirus and the Great 
Influenza Epidemic – Lessons from the ‘Spanish Flu’ for the Coronavirus’s potential 
effects on mortality and economic activity”. CESifo Working Paper Series, no. 8166 
(2020). 
Barua, Suborna. “Understanding Coronanomics: The economic implications of the cor-
onavirus (COVID-19) pandemic”. MPRA Paper, no. 99693. 2020. https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/99693/.
Béland, Louis-Philippe, Abel Brodeur and Taylor Wright. “The short-term economic 
consequences of COVID-19: Exposure to disease, remote work and government 
response”. IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Discussion Paper Series, no. 13159. 2020. 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp13159.pdf.
A Biondi and Elisabetta Righini. “An evolutionary theory of State aid control”. In 
The Oxford Handbook of European Law, edited by Damian Chalmers and Anthony 
Arnull. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Blauberger, Michael. “Of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subsidies: European State aid control through 
soft and hard law”. West European Politics 32, no.4 (2009): 719-737.
Chen, Sophia, Deniz O. Igan, Nicola Pierri and Andrea F. Presbitero. ‘Tracking the eco-
nomic impact of COVID-19 and mitigation policies in Europe and the United States’. 
IMF Special Series on COVID-19, 2020. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/
Issues/2020/07/10/Tracking-the-Economic-Impact-of-COVID-19-and-Mitigation-
Policies-in-Europe-and-the-United-49553.
Danielsson, Jon, Robert Macrae, Dimitri Vayanos, and Jean-Pierre Zigrand. “The 
coronavirus crisis is no 2008”. VoxEU CEPR. 2020. https://voxeu.org/article/
coronavirus-crisis-no-2008.
Eichenbaum, Martin S., Sergio Rebelo and Mathias Trabandt. “The macroeconomics 
of epidemics”. NBER Working Papers, no. 26882. 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/
w26882.pdf.
Ezrachi, Ariel. “Behavioural remedies in  EC merger control, scope and limitations”. 
World Competition 29, no. 3 (2006): 459-479.
Federico, R.. “Aiuti di stato e concorrenza fiscale tra Stati: la crisi della sovranità nazion-
ale durante l’emergenza Covid-19”. Concorrenza e Mercato 2020, I (2020).
Gray, Joana and Francesco de Cecco. “Competition, stability and moral hazard: The 
tension between financial regulation and State aid control”. In Research Handbook on 
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   39 28/10/2020   23:06:49
40  Market and Competition Law Review / volume iv / no. 2 / october 2020 / 17-40
State Aid in the Banking Sector, edited by François-Charles Laprévote, Joanna.Gray 
and Francesco de Cecco. United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017.
Lamadrid, Alfonso and José Luis Buendia. “A moment of truth for the EU: A proposal 
for a State aid solidarity fund”. Chilling Competition. 2020. https://chillingcompeti-
tion.com/2020/03/31/a-moment-of-truth-for-the-eu-a-proposal-for-a-State-aid-soli-
darity-fund/.
Martin, Ben R. “R&D policy instruments – a critical review of what we do and don’t 
know”. Industry and Innovation, 23, no. 2 (2016): 157-176.
Merola, Massimo. “Aiuti di stato e Covid 19 – webinar session”. Associazione Italiana 
Antitrus. June 2020. https://www.associazioneantitrustitaliana.it/attivita/webinar/
aiuti-di-stato-ai-tempi-del-coronavirus-parte-2-il-temporary-framework-della-com-
missione-europea-e-le-ricapitalizzazioni-in-equity/.
Motta, Massimo and Martin Petz,  “EU State aid policies in the time of COVID-19”. 
VoxEU CEPR. 2020. https://voxeu.org/article/eu-State-aid-policies-time-covid-19.
Nicolaides, Phedon. “the coronavirus can infect banks too: The applicability of the 
EU banking and State aid regimes”. European State Aid Law Quarterly 19, 1 (2020): 
29-38.
Stefan, Oana. “COVID-19 soft law: Voluminous, effective, legitimate? A research 
agenda”. European Papers 5, no. 1 (2020): 663-670.
M&CLR_IV_2.indd   40 28/10/2020   23:06:49
